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The dilemma in cooperation is one of the major concerns in game theory. In a public-goods
game, each individual pays a cost for cooperation, or to prevent defection, and receives a
reward from the collected cost in a group. Thus, defection is beneficial for each individual,
while cooperation is beneficial for the group. Now, groups (say, countries) consisting of indi-
vidual players also play games. To study such a multi-level game, we introduce a hierarchical
public-goods (HPG) game in which two groups compete for finite resources by utilizing costs
collected from individuals in each group. Analyzing this HPG game, we found a hierarchical
prisoner’s dilemma, in which groups choose the defection policy (say, armaments) as a Nash
strategy to optimize each group’s benefit, while cooperation optimizes the total benefit. On
the other hand, for each individual within a group, refusing to pay the cost (say, tax) is a
Nash strategy, which turns to be a cooperation policy for the group, thus leading to a hier-
archical dilemma. Here, the reward received by one group increases with the population, as
does the collected cost. In spite of this, we find that there exists an optimal group size that
maximizes its payoff. Furthermore, when the population asymmetry between two groups is
large, a smaller group will choose a cooperation policy (say, disarmament) to avoid exces-
sive response from the larger group, which leads to the resolution of the prisoner’s dilemma
between the groups. The relevance of the HPG game to policy selection in society and the
optimal size in human or animal groups are discussed accordingly.
2INTRODUCTION
Hierarchical structures are ubiquitous in society. For example, a human society or a country
consists of people, while the world or a higher group of societies consists of countries or lower-level
groups. Such a hierarchy also exists in some animal societies, where herds in a region interact
with each other. Within a group or country, individuals may cooperate or defect, whereas a group
(country) chooses some policy to interact with other groups. Thus, interplay between intra-group
strategies of individuals and inter-group policy is important in understanding the social structure
of cooperation.
In considering cooperation among individuals within a group, the public goods (PG) game is
commonly adopted[1–3]. In the PG game, each individual has to pay a certain cost for the goods in
the society, while not paying the cost will be advantageous for the individual. How cooperation in
a society is achieved has been extensively studied in the PG game[4–6]. For example, each person
in a country is asked to pay a tax for the country, with which each can get equal welfare as payoffs
from the country, depending on the total taxes collected. Here the total payoff of the country is
maximized when all individuals cooperate in paying the required taxes. This achieves the Pareto
optimum in an intra-group game. On the other hand, each individual can choose to free-ride,
i.e., tries to receive the payoff without paying the tax, for his or her own benefit. Indeed, the
Nash equilibrium[7], or the optimal strategy, for an individual is achieved when all people free-ride
which, however, results in smaller payoffs. This situation is common to the standard prisoner’s
dilemma[8, 9].
To study cooperation in a hierarchical society, however, we need to consider inter-group games
also, where groups compete for resources with each other. As an example, we consider a simple
allegorical situation in which each country struggles for finite resources using arms, for which taxes
are collected from the people. Each country faces a strategic choice: either compete for resources
participating in arms race or cooperate and divide the resources without suffering the losses from
war. However, each individual has to choose whether to cooperate by paying tax or evade it.
In this sense, the game in question is hierarchical in nature. A defection at the individual level
leads to cooperation at the group level, whereas cooperation at the individual level in paying tax
leads to a struggle at the group level in arms race. In terms of game theory, the former implies a
Pareto equilibrium between groups, whereas the latter leads to a Nash equilibrium for each group.
Disagreement between the two strategies implies a prisoner’s dilemma, which exists across levels
as well. It is important to formulate this hierarchical game with a prisoner’s dilemma across levels.
3In order to reveal the fundamental features of hierarchical societies, we introduce and analyze
a new prototype for a multi-level game, which we refer to as the hierarchical public-goods (HPG)
game. In the HPG game, groups compete for resources, and individuals simultaneously play the
PG game within each group. Here, note that the ability to obtain resources generally depends on
the group size, (i.e., population size of the group). Hence, this group size effect is introduced as
the dependence of the individual payoff on the group size.
We analyze the optimal choice of strategy both at the individual and group levels, and find a
novel type of dilemma intrinsic to the hierarchical game, which we call the hierarchical prisoner’s
dilemma. We show that a hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma emerges when the two group sizes are
not largely different. However, with a large group size difference, defection (i.e., refusal to pay the
cost) is favored at the individual level in a relatively smaller group, and the hierarchical dilemma
is avoided.
There have been previous studies on multi-level games in which groups compete with each
other following individual players’ actions[10–12]. Although these studies have discussed context
dependence of cooperation and defection on levels, they have not introduced an action strategy at
the group level in their games. However, Traulsen and Nowak[13] studied multi-level selection of
groups consisting of individuals that either cooperate or defect. Groups are selected depending on
the fitness computed from the action of individuals, where a defector (parasite) gets an advantage at
the individual level, but a group dominated by such individuals has lower fitness and is eliminated.
With this multi-level selection, they obtained a condition for cooperative individuals to be fixed.
In their study, however, the groups do not play a game with each other, and their fitness is just
given by the actions of individuals within the group. In a hierarchical society, in contrast, each
group (e.g., a country) plays an inter-group game, and chooses an action depending on its own
policy. Our model, thus, provides a general framework for multi-layer competition.
MODEL OF THE HPG GAME
We now introduce a model for the HPG game, in which two groups compete with each other
for a restricted amount of resource. (Throughout the present paper, the number of groups is
set to two, but extension to more groups is straightforward.) An individual belongs to one of
the groups and pays a cost to his or her own group. Each group utilizes all the costs collected
from the individuals in the group to win the competition with the other groups. We assume that
the competitive capacity of a group increases with the number of individuals, in addition to the
4summed cost, considering the collective effect of the population. To be specific, the capacity is
assumed to be proportional to both the α-th power of the population and the summed cost. Here,
α is a positive number that characterizes the efficiency of utilizing the cost for the competition:
the larger α is, the more the advantage of the larger group.
This α-th power of the population follows, for example, Lanchester’s law[14], in which the
strength of military forces increases with the α-th power of the population. For example, α = 1
holds in a battle on a narrow bridge, and α = 2 in a wide field. Furthermore, this type of law
is also applicable to competitions in biological groups[15–17]. McGlynn et al.[15] carried out an
experiment of ants to compete for foods in pallets and found that a larger (smaller) group has
more advantage when the entrance of pallets is wider (narrower). In this case, the entrance size
could correspond to the exponent α.
We now formulate the HPG explicitly. Consider a situation in which N individuals are divided
into two groups with populations (N1, N2) and N1+N2 = N . Without loss of generality, group 1 is
assumed to have a larger population, i.e., N1 ≥ N2, throughout the paper. The payoff of individual
j ∈ {1, · · · , Ni} in the group i ∈ {1, 2} is defined as
uij =
1
Ni
XiN
α
i
X1N
α
1 +X2N
α
2
M − xij. (1)
Here, xij (≥ 0) is the cost paid by individual j in group i, while Xi :=
∑
j xij is the sum of
individuals’ costs in the group i. M is the total amount of the resource, which is divided into
the two groups according to the capacity of each group, which is proportional to XiN
α
i . The first
term in uij gives the reward, that is, the resource distributed among the individuals according to
the group’s total cost, while the second term gives the cost paid by each individual. The payoff
function is defined as the reward reduced by the cost paid. The payoff function Eq. 1 in HPG is
schematically shown in Fig. 1.
Now the average payoff in all group games, written as uave, is given by
uave :=
1
N
∑
ij
uij =
M
N
− 1
N
∑
ij
xij . (2)
From Eq. 2, when xij = 0 holds for any i, j, the average payoff uave takes the maximum value.
In other words, when all individuals do not pay any cost, the groups do not compete with each
other, and the total average payoff is maximal. This implies that xij = 0 for any i, j is the Pareto
optimum.
5FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of the HPG game. Individuals (i, j) belong to one of the two groups i ∈ {1, 2},
and j ∈ {1, · · · , Ni}, where Ni is group i’s size. The power of each group to obtain a resource is given by
XiN
α
i , where Xi is the accumulated cost paid by the individuals in group i.
GAME BETWEEN GROUPS
Before considering the role of individuals in the HPG game, we study a characteristic feature of
the above inter-group game. Here, groups 1 and 2 compete with each other for a restricted amount
of resource M , by paying costs X1 and X2. Using the HPG model (Eq. 1), the payoff function of
group i is defined as
Ui =
XiN
α
i
X1N
α
1 +X2N
α
2
M −Xi. (3)
We now consider the Nash equilibrium, where each player is a group, not an individual. The
cost of the group Nash equilibrium, denoted as (XGN1 ,X
GN
2 ), satisfies
∂Ui
∂Xi
∣∣∣∣
{Xi=XGNi |i∈{1,2}}
= 0
for any i. From this, (XGN1 ,X
GN
2 ) is given by
XGNi =
Nα1 N
α
2
(Nα1 +N
α
2 )
2
M.
Then, each group’s payoff in the Nash equilibrium, denoted by (UGN1 , U
GN
2 ), is given by
UGNi =
N2αi
(Nα1 +N
α
2 )
2
M.
In the Nash equilibrium, both the groups need to make substantial payments because if one group
pays less, more resources are taken by the other. However, if both the groups agree not to pay
the cost for the struggle, i.e., succeed in cooperation, all the resources are distributed without any
6costs. In this case, they can achieve the Pareto optimum, whose cost (XGP1 ,X
GP
2 ) is given by
XGPi = 0.
In this case, resource allocation to each group is indefinite in Eq. 3. However, if we take the limit
Xi → 0, keeping X1 = X2, then each group’s payoff in the (group) Pareto optimum (UGP1 , UGP2 ) is
given by
UGPi =
Nαi
Nα1 +N
α
2
M.
Since both XGNi > X
GP
i and U
GN
i < U
GP
i hold, there exists a prisoner’s dilemma, i.e., the payoff
of the Nash equilibrium is smaller than the Pareto optimum.
As an example of inter-group prisoner’s dilemma, consider the case in which each country
attempts to pay more costs for arms to compete with other countries. This leads to an arms
race, resulting in paying more army expenditure as in a Nash equilibrium, while they can obtain
resources without costs as in a Pareto equilibrium, if the countries somehow disagree for arms race.
GAME BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS
We next focus on the cost and payoff of each individual. First, we consider the intra-group
game of individuals only within a single group (i.e., group 1, the larger group), whereas the total
cost in the other group X2 is fixed. Then, we obtain the cost of individuals in group 1 who
satisfy the Nash versus Pareto strategies, which correspond to the group 1 policies of defection and
cooperation, respectively.
First, we consider the Nash equilibrium at the individual level, in which each individual in group
1 pursues his or her own benefit. As will be shown, this strategy is to defect for the benefit of the
group; for simplicity, it is denoted as Defection (D). Then, individual j in group 1 determines his
or her own cost as a function of X2, denoted as x1j = x1j(D)(X2), to maximize one’s own payoff
u1j , whose condition is given by
∂u1j
∂x1j
∣∣∣∣
{x1j=x1j(D)(X2)|j∈{1,··· ,N1}}
= 0 (∀j)
⇔ X1(D)(X2) =
√
M
N1
(
N2
N1
)α
X2 −
(
N2
N1
)α
X2.
Here, X1(D)(X2) :=
∑
j x1j(D)(X2) is the total cost in group 1 when all individuals defect.
X1(D)(X2) represents the total cost in the individual Nash equilibrium as a function of the fixed
7FIG. 2. Each group’s total cost (X1, X2) for four policies, (CC), (CD), (DC), and(DD). The blue (green)
solid line indicates that X1 responds to X2 when group 1 chooses C (D), while the blue (green) broken line
indicates that X2 responds to X1 when group 2 chooses C (D). The intersections of each solid and broken
line indicate the equilibrium points. The left (right) figure is for (N1, N2) = (17, 13) ((27, 3)). The payoff of
each group is determined by each equilibrium point.
cost of the other group. Then, the total payoff in group 1, denoted as U1(D)(X2), is given by
U1(D)(X2) =
X1(D)(X2)N
α
1
X1(D)(X2)N
α
1 +X2N
α
2
M −X1(D)(X2).
Second, we consider the Pareto equilibrium in each individual’s game in group 1. In this case,
each individual pays a cost to maximize the benefit of group 1, so that it is simply denoted as
Cooperative (C). Now, to maximize the group’s payoff U1, the cost of individual j in group 1,
x1j = x1j(C)(X2), has to satisfy the condition
∂U1
∂X1
∣∣∣∣
{x1j=x1j(C)(X2)|j∈{1,··· ,N1}}
= 0 (∀j)
⇔ X1(C)(X2) =
√
M
(
N2
N1
)α
X2 −
(
N2
N1
)α
X2,
where X1(C)(X2) :=
∑
j x1j(C)(X2) is the total cost in group 1 when all individuals cooperate.
X1(C)(X2) represents the total cost in the individual Pareto optimum. Then, the total payoff in
group 1, denoted as U1(C)(X2), is given by
U1(C)(X2) =
X1(C)(X2)N
α
1
X1(C)(X2)N
α
1 +X2N
α
2
M −X1(C)(X2).
From a comparison of the above two cases, X1(C)(X2) > X1(D)(X2) and U1(C)(X2) > U1(D)(X2)
hold. Thus, there exists a prisoner’s dilemma in the individual game inside a group (see Supporting
Information): When the individuals in group 1 cooperate, the group collects more costs from its
members and receive a higher payoff, but an attempt to minimize its own cost leads to the less
beneficial Nash equilibrium. Individuals do not pay sufficient costs to compete with the other
group if they defect, while the payment is sufficient for cooperation.
8The same argument applies to group 2 to determineX2(D)(X1), U2(D)(X1), X2(C)(X1), U2(C)(X1).
In addition, X2(C)(X1) > X2(D)(X1) and U2(C)(X1) > U2(D)(X1) also hold.
Third, we consider a situation in which each group can choose either cooperation or defection
for individuals. In this case, “C” and “D” are regarded as the “policies” of each group. Now,
the two groups have totally four choices, (YZ) with Y ∈ {C,D} and Z ∈ {C,D}, where Y (Z)
indicates the policy in group 1 (2). Then, the equilibrium total cost in each group, denoted as
(X1(YZ),X2(YZ)), satisfies
X1(YZ) = X1(Y)(X2(YZ)),
X2(YZ) = X2(Z)(X1(YZ)).
In this way, each equilibrium point (X1(YZ),X2(YZ)) is determined from the balance of costs between
the two groups (see Supporting Information). In other words, it is given as a cross point of
two functions, X1(Y)(X2) and X2(Z)(X1), in the X1-X2 plane (see Fig. 2 for the two cases of
N1 = 17, N2 = 13 and N1 = 27, N2 = 3). With the further assumption that each individual in the
same group pays equally, xij(YZ) = Xi(YZ)/Ni, the individual payoff in group 1 is obtained as

u1j(CC) =
1
N1
(
Nα1
Nα1 +N
α
2
)2M,
u1j(CD) =
1
N1
(
Nα1
Nα1 +N
α−1
2
)2M,
u1j(DC) =
1
N1
N
α−1
1
N
α−1
1 +N
α
2
(1− 1
N1
Nα2
N
α−1
1 +N
α
2
)M,
u1j(DD) =
1
N1
N
α−1
1
N
α−1
1 +N
α−1
2
(1− 1
N1
N
α−1
2
N
α−1
1 +N
α−1
2
)M,
(4)
whereas the expression for group 2 is obtained by replacing 1 with 2 (see Supporting Information).
PAYOFF DISTRIBUTION
From Eq. 4, we can compare the individual payoff in each group optimized in the four cases
(CC), (CD), (DC), and (DD). For example, the individual payoff in each case is plotted as a function
of N1 in Fig. 3 for N = 30 and α = 2.5. From Fig. 2, we can see how the restricted amount of
resource is distributed between the two groups for each of the four cases (CC), (CD), (DC), and
(DD).
First, u1j ≥ u2j holds for (CC), (CD), and (DD). For group 1 (with a larger group size), more
costs can be recovered with the cooperation policy than the defection policy, so that the former
is more advantageous. Next, if the two groups adopt the same policy, the group size power works
for group 1 so it can amplify its costs and obtain a higher payoff than a small group. Thus, for
9the cases (CC), (CD), and (DD), individuals in group 1 always receive higher payoffs than those
in group 2 for any N1 > N2.
For (DC), however, the merit of group size and the demerit in the policy counterbalance each
other, so that whether u1j ≥ u2j holds depends on N1. With a large asymmetry between group
sizes (N1 ≫ N2), the group size merit outweighs the policy demerit so that group 1 members receive
higher payoffs. However, group 2 members receive higher payoffs when group size asymmetry is
small, (N1 ≃ N2).
Second, we discuss the dependence of individual payoff u1j in the larger group on N1. As
mentioned for (CC), (CD), (DD), and (DC), with N1 ≫ N2, group 1 gets a larger payoff. In these
cases, there exists an optimal N1 that maximizes u1j . This is understood as follows: With the
increase in group size, the group payoff increases with Nα1 as long as N1 is not too large. The
individual payoff, i.e., the group payoff divided by N1, then increases with the group size, as long
as α > 1. As the group size is further increased, however, the increase in the group payoff U1 starts
to be saturated (see Eq. 3), so that the individual payoff starts to decrease (see Fig. 3-A). Thus,
there is an optimal group size for the dominant group (group 1), denoted by Nop1 , in spite of the
reward increase with Nα1 . However, in the case of (DC) with N1 ≃ N2, the reward of group 1 is
smaller than that of group 2. Then, the increase in payoff with the group size is not saturated, so
that u1j monotonically increases with its group size N1.
The dependence of individual payoff u2j on N2 is studied similarly. For (CC), (CD), (DD),
and (DC), with N1 ≫ N2, group 2 is dominated by group 1. Therefore, the individual payoff u2j
monotonically increases with N2 (i.e., it decreases with N1). For (DC), however, group 2 dominates
in the resource competition, and u2j is maximized at an optimal group size (see Fig. 3-B).
Last, we study the total payoff uave averaged over the whole population. From Eq. 2, the average
payoff decreases when the average cost in all groups increases, which increases as the competition
between the groups is stronger. Now, for (CC), (CD), and (DD), uave increases and the average
decreases monotonically with N1. In contrast, uave has a local minimum for (DC). Therefore, group
1 has a greater advantage than group 2 for N1 ≫ N2, where the competition is weak. However, the
payoff for group 2 increases with a decrease in N1, where the competition is stronger. Therefore,
uave has a local minimum at the intermediate value of N1.
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FIG. 3. Individual payoff of larger group u1j (A) and smaller group u2j (B), and the aver-
age payoff over total population uave (C) plotted as a function of N1 for four policy scenarios
{(CC : blue), (CD : green), (DC : red), (DD : cyan)} upon N = 30. We can see the following four proper-
ties from these cases. For (CC), (CD), and(DD), u1j > u2j always holds. For (DC), u1j > u2j holds in
N1 ≫ N2 while u1j < u2j holds in N1 ≃ N2. From (A), we note that u1j always has a local maximum.
From (B), we note that u2j has a local maximum for (DC). From (C), we see that uave monotonically
increases with N1 for (CC), (CD), and(DD), while it has a local minimum for (DC).
HIERARCHICAL PRISONER’S DILEMMA
X1(C)(X2) > X1(D)(X2) and X2(C)(X1) > X2(D)(X1) follow from the above result, so that both
the groups should choose the cooperation policy if the other group’s cost is constant. Therefore,
both groups attempt to choose (CC) policies on their own. However, when both groups’ policies
are (CC), the resultant payoff is sometimes smaller than that by the choice of (DD) policies. In
other words, there exists a prisoner’s dilemma in the game of the two groups. (Note that the role
of C and D is converted from the standard prisoner’s dilemma.) To discuss the existence of the
dilemma, we examine the individual payoff matrix for the four cases (CC), (CD), (DC), and (DD)
as follows.
First, we consider a case in which the asymmetry between group sizes is small enough, N1 ≃ N2
(i.e., N1 < N
HPD
1 ). Here, as seen in Fig. 3, both u1j(CY) > u1j(DY) and u2j(YC) > u2j(YD) hold
for any Y ∈ {C,D}. In other words, individuals in each group receive higher payoffs when they
cooperate rather than defect regardless of the other group’s policy. However, when we compare
(CC) and (DD), Xi(CC) > Xi(DD) holds (see e.g. Fig. 2-A). As group size asymmetry is small, the
reward in Eq. 1 does not increase much with a cost. Since the numerator and denominator increase
almost at an equal rate, and the payoff is (reward - cost), uij(DD) > uij(CC) holds (see Fig. 3). These
results indicate a prisoner’s dilemma, which we call the hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma.
As for the analogy to the military game between the two countries, each country tends to collect
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more taxes for arms race. However, this increases the loss by war. In contrast, defection (i.e., refusal
to pay taxes) will decrease the military cost, and will result in benefit to both countries.
This dilemma does not exist when the asymmetry between group sizes is too large, N1 ≫ N2
(i.e., N1 > N
HPD
1 ). Indeed, from Fig. 3, u1j(DD) < u1j(CC) conversely holds. This is explained as
follows: As seen in Fig. 2-B, X1(CC) > X1(DD) holds as in the case of N1 ≃ N2. Then, for N1 ≫ N2,
the increase in X1 leads to a decrease in X2, resulting in X2(CC) < X2(DD) in contrast to the case of
N1 ≃ N2. In the case of (CC), therefore, group 1 receives a higher payoff than (DD). Thus, when
N1 ≫ N2 holds, the hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma does not exist. As explained above, whether
the hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma exists or not can be judged by the configuration between Xi(CC)
and Xi(DD) (compare Fig. 2-A with 2-B).
EXCESSIVE RESPONSE
When the hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma is avoided for N1 ≫ N2, group 2 receives a higher
payoff by following the defection policy. Indeed, whether u2j(YC) or u2j(YD) is larger depends
on group size differences, as shown in Fig. 3, which is summarized in Table 1: It shows that
u2j(CC) > u2j(CD) holds for N1 ≃ N2 (i.e., N1 < NER1 ), while u2j(CC) < u2j(CD) holds for N1 ≫ N2
(i.e., N1 > N
ER
1 ). In other words, group 2 should choose the defection policy when its group size
is small.
TABLE I. Dependence of group payoff configurations upon N1 (N is set to 30).
dependence on N1 group 1:C group 1:D
15 ≤ N1 ≤ 20 u2j(CC) > u2j(CD) u2j(DC) > u2j(DD)
21 ≤ N1 ≤ 25 u2j(CC) < u2j(CD) u2j(DC) > u2j(DD)
26 ≤ N1 ≤ 29 u2j(CC) < u2j(CD) u2j(DC) < u2j(DD)
We now explain the reason for this unexpected outcome. In Fig. 2-B, X2(YC) ≃ X2(YD) and
X1(YC) > X1(YD) hold. When group 2 changes its policy from D to C, its cost could increase if
X1 is fixed (see the broken blue line in Fig. 2-B). However, in response to the policy of group
2, group 1 will increase its cost, so that group 1 takes back the resource that could be lost with
the cost increase in group 2. This response from group 1 is excessive for group 2, and the cost
increase in group 2 is suppressed so that X2(YC) ≃ X2(YD) holds (see the cross-point (CC) in
Fig. 2-B). Recall that the reward of group 2 is given by
X2N
α
2
X1N
α
1 +X2N
α
2
M according to Eq. 1. Then,
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with the increase in X1, the reward of group 2 decreases as long as its cost does not increase much.
Therefore, u2j(CY) < u2j(DY) holds. As explained above, whether this “excessive response” occurs
is determined by the positional relationship between Xi(YC) and Xi(YD), which depends on N1/N .
In summary, an excessive response by group 1 against the cooperation policy of group 2 leads
to this unexpected outcome. When individuals in group 2 play only the intra-group game, they
attempt to cooperate. By taking the inter-group game into account, they can avoid an excessive
response from the other group against the cooperative strategy, so that they choose the defection
policy.
Let us recall the analogy of the present game to the military game between two countries,
where the individual cost corresponds to the military tax of the people, and cooperation means
the armament. If a small country collects more tax for arms race, the larger country increases its
armaments in response, so that the payoff of the smaller country decreases. Hence, defection, i.e.,
decreasing the military tax, is a better policy for the smaller country.
DEPENDENCE ON N
The excessive response and hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma discussed so far occur for any total
population N , while the region in which the former exists (defined as N1 > N
ER
1 ) decreases with
an increase in N . As shown in Supporting Information, the value RER := N
ER
1 /N is estimated as
RER ≃ 1−N−
1
α+1 ,
in the limit of N → ∞. However, the hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma occurs in the region N1 <
NHPD1 , and the value RHPD := N
HPD
1 /N satisfies, in the limit of N →∞,
(1 +Kα)2 = 1 +Kα−1,
with K := (1−RHPD)/RHPD.
As for the optimal size Nop1 for the policies CC, Rop := N
op
1 /N satisfies
2α(1 −Rop)α−1 = Rαop + (1−Rop)α
in the limit of N →∞ (see Supporting Information).
DEPENDENCE ON α
So far, we have adopted α = 2.5. Indeed, the behaviors we reported here are universally
observed as long as α > 0. The phase diagram for the regions with the hierarchical prisoner’s
13
FIG. 4. The regimes with the hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma (red) and excessive response (cyan) plotted
against α (horizontal axis) and N1/N (vertical axis). In the yellow region, neither of the two exists. When
α > 2 holds, there exists optimal group size Nop1 (black line) for the larger group. Computed for N = 50.
dilemma and excessive response are shown in Fig. 4 against the change in α and N1/(N1 + N2).
Since α represents the advantage of the larger group relative to the smaller group, the region with
excessive response (HPD) decreases (increases) with a decrease in α.
For α < 2, u2j(DD) > u1j(DD) always holds, and for α < 1.5, u2j(DC) > u1j(DC) holds. In other
words, individuals in the smaller group receive higher payoffs than those in the larger group, when
the latter’s policy is defection. For details of the behavior for α < 2, see Supporting Information.
DISCUSSION
In the present paper, we have introduced and analyzed a new game, called the HPG game. A
cost is paid according to each player’s strategy, while groups play a game to compete for resources,
depending on the collected costs in a group. The policies of the group are determined as cooperation
(C) or defection (D) according to whether each player in the group pays a cost or not.
In this game, we uncovered a novel type of dilemma, which we term the hierarchical prisoner’s
dilemma: Each group receives a higher payoff by choosing policy C rather than D if the other
group’s cost is constant. Hence (CC) is the Nash equilibrium in the game between the groups.
However, the payoff that each group receives is lower than if the groups chose (DD), and thus
the prisoner’s dilemma occurs. We again emphasize that C (D) means cooperation (defection) in
terms of the intra-group game, while C (D) inversely implies defection (cooperation) in terms of
the inter-group game.
However, for each individual, there also exists a dilemma, typical of the PG game. Every
individual prefers not to pay the cost, i.e., to choose D. It is interesting and important that in our
HPG game, the cooperation in intra-group game leads to defection in the inter-group game. This
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hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma was first formulated in the present study.
In the present model, this dilemma exists if the two group sizes are not very different. As the
group size difference increases, the larger group always gets an advantage by paying the costs of
competition and, thus, avoiding this hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma. If the difference is sufficiently
large, both groups receive higher payoffs when the smaller group follows the D policy. Indeed, if the
smaller group pursues C, i.e., it pays more to compete with the larger group, the latter pays more,
too, so that competition for resources increases, and the smaller group suffers a loss, as a result of
what is here termed excessive response. Hence, the smaller group abandons the cost competition,
so that the dilemma is avoided.
These findings may have some implications on the arms race or struggle between groups. If the
two groups or countries are not much different in size, they cannot avoid an arms race, which is
costly for both members. With cooperative members, the race would be stronger, and the costs
larger. In contrast, when the two countries or groups are quite different in size, the smaller group
would abandon the race, averting the loss. Of course, in reality, the interaction between groups and
resource allocation to each is more complicated, and choice of policy in each group is not simply
determined by the actions of individuals. Nevertheless, the group size dependence of the dilemma
and the choice of policies may be relevant to understand the real society.
In the present paper, we assumed, for simplicity, that all individuals in a group follow the same
action. In reality, the cost each individual within the same group pays can be different. Indeed, as
individuals play the PG game in each group, there exists a prisoner’s dilemma within the group.
In fact, defectors free-ride on cooperators, so the group would be defeated with their increase, as
shown in multi-level selection studies[13]. In the present HPG, however, if the fraction of free-riders
increases, the cost of the struggle between the groups decreases. Thus, the payoff could increase,
depending also on each group size. Hence, it will be interesting to discuss the distribution of costs
and payoffs within a group, together with its dependence on group size.
The significant role of group size uncovered here is related to Wrangham’s power-of-imbalance
hypothesis [18], in which animals attempt to form larger groups to dominate other smaller groups
when the available resources are limited. Given that a larger group has an advantage, we have
found an optimal group size that maximizes the payoff of the larger group. This is in contrast to
the naive expectation that larger groups that would ultimately coalesce to a single group would be
more advantageous. Counterintuitively, an optimal group size exists because of the limitation of
available resources, which causes the hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma, and the size depends on the
degree of power imbalance between groups. An investigation into the appropriate size of animal
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groups in nature might provide some insight. Extension of the present game to many groups with
introduction of migration among groups as well as population dynamics as in dynamical system
game[19] should be important for future issue of an appropriate size distribution.
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Supporting Information
I. GAME BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS
In this section, we derive various functions in “Game between individuals” in our paper.
In our model, a payoff function of individual j ∈ {1, · · · , Ni} in group i ∈ {1, 2} is given by
uij =
1
Ni
XiN
α
i∑
iXiN
α
i
M − xij . (5)
Here, Xi(=
∑
j xij) is the total cost in group i. From Eq. 1, the total payoff in group i is given by
Ui =
XiN
α
i∑
iXiN
α
i
M −Xi. (6)
We now consider how much each individual in group 1 pays. Here, the total cost in the opponent
group X2 is fixed. First, we consider a case in which individuals within group 1 defect. Then, each
of them chooses his or her own cost x1j(D)(X2) to maximize one’s own payoff u1j .
∂u1j
∂x1j
∣∣∣∣
{x1j=x1j(D)(X2)|j∈{1,··· ,N1}}
= 0 (∀j)
⇔ 1
N1
X2N
α
2 N
α
1
(X1(D)(X2)N
α
1 +X2N
α
2 )
2
M − 1 = 0
⇔ X1(D)(X2) =
√
M
N1
(
N2
N1
)α
X2 −
(
N2
N1
)α
X2
Here, we define X1(D)(X2) =
∑
j x1j(D)(X2). In this way, the condition for optimization of each
individual cost is determined only by the total cost in the group. From Eq. 2, the total payoff in
group 1 U1(D)(X2) is determined by
U1(D)(X2) =
X1(D)(X2)N
α
1
X1(D)(X2)N
α
1 +X2N
α
2
M −X1(D)(X2)
=M −
(√
N1 +
1√
N1
)√
M
(
N2
N1
)α
X2 +
(
N2
N1
)α
X2. (7)
Second, we consider a case in which individuals cooperate within group 1. Then, they collect a
cost of X1(C)(X2) to maximize the group’s total payoff U1.
∂U1
∂X1
|X1=X1(C)(X2) = 0
⇔ X2N
α
2 X
α
1
X1(C)(X2)N
α
1 +X2N
α
2
M − 1 = 0
⇔ X1(C)(X2) =
√
M
(
N2
N1
)α
X2 −
(
N2
N1
)α
X2
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From Eq. 2, the total payoff in group 1 U1(C)(X2) is determined by
U1(C)(X2) =
X1(C)(X2)N
α
1
X1(C)(X2)N
α
1 +X2N
α
2
M −X1(C)(X2)
=M − 2
√
M
(
N2
N1
)α
X2 +
(
N2
N1
)α
X2. (8)
We now check whether X1(C)(X2) or X1(D)(X2) is larger. From N1 ≥ 1, X1(C)(X2) ≥ X1(D)(X2)
holds for any X2. In addition, we check the magnitude relation between U1(C)(X2) and U1(D)(X2).
The first and third terms are equal between Eq. 3 and Eq. 4. Then, by comparing the second terms
with the use of
√
N1 +
1√
N1
≥ 2
we get U1(C)(X2) ≥ U1(D)(X2) for any X2.
The above results for group 1 also hold for group 2, and we obtain
X2(D)(X1) =
√
M
N2
(
N1
N2
)α
X1 −
(
N1
N2
)α
X1
U2(D)(X1) =M −
(√
N2 +
1√
N2
)√
M
(
N1
N2
)α
X1 +
(
N1
N2
)α
X1
X2(C)(X1) =
√
M
(
N1
N2
)α
X1 −
(
N1
N2
)α
X1
U2(C)(X1) =M − 2
√
M
(
N1
N2
)α
X1 +
(
N1
N2
)α
X1.
Then, both X2(C)(X1) ≥ X2(D)(X1) and U2(C)(X1) ≥ U2(D)(X1) also hold.
We now examine whether individuals in each group are cooperators or defectors. Then, four
kinds of equilibrium points are defined as (CC), (CD), (DC), (DD). Here, the left index indicates
the group 1 policy, while the right index indicates the group 2 policy. Then, the group’s total cost
in each of four equilibrium points is given by

 X1(YZ) = X1(Y)(X2(YZ))X2(YZ) = X1(Z)(X1(YZ))
Here, Y ∈ {C,D} and Z ∈ {C,D} hold. For example, when Y = C and Z = D hold, X1(CD) and
19
X2(CD) are given by 
 X1(CC) = X1(C)(X2(CC))X2(CC) = X2(C)(X1(CC))
⇔


X1(CC) =
√
M(N2
N1
)αX2(CC) − (N2N1 )αX2(CC)
X2(CC) =
√
M(N2
N1
)αX2(CC) − (N2N1 )αX2(CC)
⇔ X1(CC) = X2(CC) =
Nα1 N
α
2
(Nα1 +N
α
2 )
2
M.
Also, we obtain 

X1(CD) =
Nα1 N
α−1
2
(Nα1 +N
α−1
2 )
2
M
X2(CD) =
1
N2
Nα1 N
α−1
2
(Nα1 +N
α−1
2 )
2
M

X1(DC) =
1
N1
N
α−1
1 N
α
2
(Nα−11 +N
α
2 )
2
M
X2(DC) =
N
α−1
1 N
α
2
(Nα−11 +N
α
2 )
2
M

X1(DD) =
1
N1
N
α−1
1 N
α−1
2
(Nα−11 +N
α−1
2 )
2
M
X2(DD) =
1
N2
N
α−1
1 N
α−1
2
(Nα−11 +N
α−1
2 )
2
M.
From the assumption that all individuals pay equally within a group, the individual cost, denoted
as xij(YZ), is given by
xij(YZ) = Xi(YZ)/Ni
Then, from X1(YZ) and X2(YZ), each of the groups’ payoffs, denoted as U1(YZ) and U2(YZ), is given
by 
 U1(CC) = (
Nα1
Nα1 +N
α
2
)2M
U2(CC) = (
Nα2
Nα1 +N
α
2
)2M

U1(CD) = (
Nα1
Nα1 +N
α−1
2
)2M
U2(CD) =
N
α−1
1
Nα1 +N
α−1
2
(1− 1
N2
Nα1
Nα1 +N
α−1
2
)M

U1(DC) =
N
α−1
1
N
α−1
1 +N
α
2
(1− 1
N1
Nα2
N
α−1
1 +N
α
2
)M
U2(DC) = (
Nα2
N
α−1
1 +N
α
2
)2M

U1(DD) =
Nα−11
Nα−11 +N
α−1
2
(1− 1
N1
Nα−12
Nα−11 +N
α−1
2
)M
U2(DD) =
N
α−1
2
N
α−1
1 +N
α−1
2
(1− 1
N2
N
α−1
1
N
α−1
1 +N
α−1
2
)M.
(9)
Individual payoff, denoted as uij(YZ), is straightforwardly obtained by
uij(YZ) = Ui(YZ)/Ni.
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II. DEPENDENCE ON N
In this section, we consider under what condition each of two phenomena, excessive response
and the hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma, appears, given the total population N .
First, we consider the region where excessive response happens. Since u1j(CY) > u1j(DY) holds
for any Y ∈ {C,D}, group 1 always chooses policy C. Thus, in order to determine whether group
2 should choose policy C or D, we compare u2j(CC) and u2j(CD), given by
u2j(CC) =
1
N(1−R)
(
(1−R)α
Rα + (1−R)α
)2
M
u2j(CD) =
1
N(1−R)
(1−R)α−1
NRα + (1−R)α−1
(
1− 1
N(1−R)
NRα
NRα + (1−R)α−1
)
M
respectively, where we define R = N1/N . Noting that the condition RER at which excessive
response appears is given by u2j(CC) = u2j(CD), we get
(
(1−RER)α
NRαER + (1−RER)α
)2
=
(1−RER)α−1
NRαER + (1−RER)α−1
(
1− 1
N(1−RER)
NRαER
NRαER + (1−RER)α−1
)
.
(10)
Noting that for Eq. 6 to be satisfied against N → ∞, (1 − R) has to diverge with it and, taking
the leading order with N , we get(
(1−RER)α
NRαER
)2
=
(1−RER)α−1
NRαER
.
Thus, we obtain
RER = 1−N−
1
α+1 .
Second, we consider the region where the hierarchical prisoner’s dilemma happens. Since
u1j(CY) > u1j(DY) holds for any Y ∈ {C,D}, we compare u1j(CC) and u1j(DD). u1j(CC) and u1j(DD)
are given by
u1j(CC) =
1
NR
(
Rα
Rα + (1−R)α
)2
M,
u1j(DD) =
1
NR
Rα−1
Rα−1 + (1−R)α−1
(
1− 1
NR
(1−R)α−1
Rα−1 + (1−R)α−1
)
M.
Noting that u1j(CC) = u1j(DD) holds for R = RHPD, we get
(
RαHPD
RαHPD + (1−RHPD)α
)2
=
Rα−1HPD
Rα−1HPD + (1−RHPD)α−1
(
1− 1
NRHPD
(1−RHPD)α−1
Rα−1HPD + (1−RHPD)α−1
)
.
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In the limit of N →∞, we obtain
(1 +Kα)2 = 1 +Kα−1
with K := (1−RHPD)/RHPD.
Third, we consider the optimal size for the larger group in the case of CC. u1j(CC) is given by
u1j(CC) =
1
NR
(
Rα
Rα + (1−R)α
)2
M.
Noting that u1j(CC) is maximized for R = Rop, we get
∂u1j(CC)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
R=Rop
= 0
⇔ R
2α
op (2α(1 −Rop)α−1 − (Rαop + (1−Rop)α))
R2op(R
α
op + (1−Rop)α)3
= 0
⇔ 2α(1 −Rop)α−1 = Rαop + (1−Rop)α.
From the above result, the region of excessive response, in the limit of N → ∞, decreases
according to N , while that of hierarchical PD and optimal group size does not change (See Fig. S1).
FIG. S 1. The regimes with the hierarchical PD (red) and excessive response (cyan) plotted against α
(horizontal axis) and N1/N (vertical axis). In the yellow region, neither of the two exists. Computed for
N = 30 (left), N = 100 (central) and N = 300 (right).
III. DEPENDENCE ON α
In our paper, we assume that α > 2, which is require in order that individuals in the larger
group receive higher payoffs than those in the smaller group when both groups choose the same
policy. However, when α < 2 holds, individuals in the larger group cannot always receive higher
payoffs than those in the smaller group. In this section, we show that several transitions appear
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with decreasing α, where individual payoff in the smaller group is larger than that in the larger
group.
In the following, we study the case with N2 > 1, since the case N2 = 1 is exceptional as the
group is nothing but an individual. In this case
uij(YC) = uij(YD) (11)
holds for any i ∈ {1, 2} and Y ∈ {C,D} as seen in Eq. 5. Eq. 7 indicates that the individual payoff
in the smaller group is independent of its policy, which is identical to the group’s payoff. Indeed
for N2 = 1, the group has no “hierarchy” and, therefore, is not suitable for the present study. As
α decreases, so does the advantage of group 1 over 2. With the decrease in α, group 2 gets an
advantage over 1, first for DD, then for CD, and then for CC, and from N1 ≫ N2 to N1 ≃ N2 in
that order.
First, we recall the case of α > 2. In this case, we obtain (see Fig. S2)
u1j(CC) > u2j(CC)
u1j(CD) > u2j(CD)
u1j(DC)

 < u2j(DC) (N1 ≃ N2)> u2j(DC) (N1 ≫ N2)
u1j(DD) > u2j(DD).
FIG. S 2. Individual payoff u1j(YZ) (solid line) and u2j(YZ) (broken line) plotted as a function of N1 for
N = 30, α = 2.5. The blue (upper left), green (upper right), red (lower left) and cyan (lower right) lines
indicate YZ = CC,CD,DC, and DD, respectively.
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Second, for 1.5 < α < 2 (see Fig. S3),
u1j(CC) > u2j(CC)
u1j(CD) > u2j(CD)
u1j(DC)

 < u2j(DC) (N1 ≃ N2)> u2j(DC) (N1 ≫ N2)
u1j(DD) < u2j(DD).
FIG. S 3. Individual payoff u1j(YZ) (solid line) and u2j(YZ) (broken line) plotted as a function of N1 for
N = 30, α = 1.7. The blue (upper left), green (upper right), red (lower left), and cyan (lower right) lines
indicates YZ = CC,CD,DC, and DD, respectively.
The difference between 1.5 < α < 2 and α > 2 lies in the behavior of uij(DD). For 1.5 < α < 2,
individuals in the smaller group always [? ] receive higher payoffs than those in the larger group
do in the case of DD. Here, u1j(DD) and u2j(DD) are given by
u1j(DD) =
1
N1
Nα−11
Nα−11 +N
α−1
2
(
1− 1
N1
Nα−11
Nα−11 +N
α−1
2
)
M
u2j(DD) =
1
N2
Nα−12
Nα−11 +N
α−1
2
(
1− 1
N2
Nα−11
Nα−11 +N
α−1
2
)
M.
Now, we consider the case N1 ≥ N2 > 1. Then, noting that
1− 1
N1
Nα−11
Nα−11 +N
α−1
2
≃ 1
1− 1
N2
Nα−11
Nα−11 +N
α−1
2
≃ 1,
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we get
u1j(DD)
u2j(DD)
=
(
N1
N2
)α−2

 ≥ 1 (α > 2)< 1 (α < 2).
Third, for 1 < α < 1.5 (see Fig. S4),
u1j(CC) > u2j(CC)
u1j(CD) > u2j(CD)
u1j(DC) < u2j(DC)
u1j(DD) < u2j(DD).
FIG. S 4. Individual payoff u1j(YZ) (solid line) and u2j(YZ) (broken line) plotted as a function of N1 for
N = 30, α = 1.2. The blue (upper left), green (upper right), red (lower left), and cyan (lower right) lines
indicate YZ = CC,CD,DC, and DD, respectively.
The difference between 1 < α < 1.5 and 1.5 < α < 2 lies in the behaviors of uij(DC). For
1 < α < 1.5, individuals in the smaller group always receive higher payoffs than those in the larger
group do in the case of DC. Here, u1j(DC) and u2j(DC) are given by
u1j(DC) =
1
N1
Nα−11
Nα−11 +N
α
2
(
1− 1
N1
Nα2
Nα−11 +N
α
2
)
M
u2j(DC) =
1
N2
(
Nα2
Nα−11 +N
α
2
)2
M.
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Recall that u1j(DC) > u2j(DC) holds for N1 ≫ N2, 1.5 < α < 2. Thus, we consider the transition
for N1 ≫ N2 > 1, where we get
u1j(DC)
u2j(DC)
=
Nα−31 (N
α
1 + (N1 − 1)Nα2 )
N2α−12
≃ N2α−31
Nα2 + 1
N2α−12
 & 1 (α > 1.5). 1 (α < 1.5).
Then, u1j(DC) < u2j(DC) always holds in the case of α < 1.5.
Fourth, for 0.5 < α < 1 (see Fig. S5),
u1j(CC) > u2j(CC)
u1j(CD)

 > u2j(CD) (N1 ≃ N2)< u2j(CD) (N1 ≫ N2)
u1j(DC) < u2j(DC)
u1j(DD) < u2j(DD).
FIG. S 5. Individual payoff u1j(YZ) (solid line) and u2j(YZ) (broken line) plotted as a function of N1 for
N = 30, α = 0.52. The blue (upper left), green (upper right), red (lower left), and cyan (lower right) lines
indicate YZ = CC,CD,DC, and DD, respectively.
The difference between 0.5 < α < 1 and 1 < α < 1.5 lies in the behavior of uij(CD). For
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0.5 < α < 1, individuals in the smaller group receive higher payoffs than those in the larger one do
in the case of CD for N1 ≫ N2 [? ]
Here, u1j(CD) and u2j(CD) are given by
u1j(CD) =
1
N1
(
Nα1
Nα1 +N
α−1
2
)2
M
u2j(CD) =
1
N2
Nα−11
Nα1 +N
α−1
2
(
1− 1
N2
Nα1
Nα1 +N
α−1
2
)
M.
Then, assuming N1 ≫ N2 > 1, we obtain
u2j(CD)
u1j(CD)
=
Nα−32 ((N2 − 1)Nα1 +Nα2 )
N2α−11
≃ N1−α1 Nα−32 (N2 − 1)
 . 1 (α > 1)& 1 (α < 1)
Thus, u1j(CD) < u2j(CD) sometimes holds in the case of 0.5 < α < 1.
Fifth, for α < 0.5 (see Fig. S6),
u1j(CC) < u2j(CC)
u1j(CD)

 > u2j(CD) (N1 ≃ N2)< u2j(CD) (N1 ≫ N2)
u1j(DC) < u2j(DC)
u1j(DD) < u2j(DD).
27
FIG. S 6. Individual payoff u1j(YZ) (solid line) and u2j(YZ) (broken line) plotted as a function of N1 for
N = 30, α = 0.48. The blue (upper left), green (upper right), red (lower left), and cyan (lower right) lines
indicates YZ = CC,CD,DC, and DD, respectively.
The difference between α < 0.5 and 0.5 < α < 1 lies in the behavior of uij(CC). For 0.5 < α < 1,
individuals in the smaller group always receive higher payoffs than those in the larger one do the
case of CC. Here, u1j(CC) and u2j(CC) are given by
u1j(CC) =
1
N1
(
Nα1
Nα1 +N
α
2
)2
M
u2j(CC) =
1
N2
(
Nα2
Nα1 +N
α
2
)2
M.
Then, we obtain
u2j(CC)
u1j(CC)
=
(
N2
N1
)2α−1

 < 1 (α > 0.5)> 1 (α < 0.5).
Thus, u1j(CC) < u2j(CC) always holds in the case of α < 0.5.
